Title: Anglo-Canadian Wartime Relations, 1939-1945: RAF Bomber Command and No. 6 (Canadian) Group

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Abstract:

In its broadest perspective the following thesis is a case study in Anglo-Canadian relations during the Second World War. The specific subject is the relationship between RAF Bomber Command and No. 6 (Canadian) Group, with emphasis on its political, operational (military), and social aspects.

The Prologue describes the bombing raid on Dortmund of 6/7 October, 1944, and has two purposes. The first is to set the stage for the subsequent analysis of the Anglo-Canadian relationship and to serve as a reminder of the underlying operational realities. The second is to show to what extent Canadian air power had grown during the war by highlighting the raid that was No. 6 Group's maximum effort of the bombing campaign.

Chapter 1 deals with the political negotiations and problems associated with the creation of No. 6 Group on 25 October, 1942. The analysis begins with an account of how the Mackenzie King government placed all RCAF aircrew graduates of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan at the disposal of the RAF and then had to negotiate for the right to concentrate RCAF aircrew overseas in their own squadrons and higher formations. This policy of concentration was known as 'Canadianization' and its greatest success was the establishment of the Canadian Bomber Group.

The second chapter is an operational history of No. 6 Group. Inevitably, this largely reflected the fortunes of Bomber Command as a whole. The Group's performance during the period from January 1943 to March 1944 was lacklustre; only after the advent of the pre-invasion bombing camping of 1944 did it improve. The period from April 1944 to May 1945 was one of triumph as the Group's performance improved remarkably.

Chapter 3 deals with social relations between RCAF personnel overseas and the RAF and English civilians. During the early years, 1941 and 1942, relations between the Canadians and their hosts were poor, primarily because of mutual misunderstanding. In the period 1943 to 1945 the two sides settled down and got to know each other better, thereby leading to an overall improvement in Anglo-Canadian relations. Even so, there were always points of friction between RCAF personnel overseas and the RAF.

The fourth chapter examines four intergovernmental disputes over the policy and administration of the RCAF Overseas: namely, Canadianization, commissioning, special aircrew leave, and the duration of an operational tour. In spite of the victory achieved by the creation of No. 6 Group, the Canadian government had difficulty at the policy level because the British still had to be consulted regarding the effects of such decisions on the war effort. The history of those disputes underscores the importance for Canada of maintaining administrative autonomy over her own service personnel, even in the absence of strategic control.

Two key themes are brought out in the Conclusion. The first is that although the struggle for RCAF administrative autonomy overseas had little strategic significance, this period was a most vital and necessary one in the development of the RCAF as a separate service within the Canadian Armed Forces. The second is the degree to which a small nation like Canada finds it impossible to retain strategic control over her own armed forces when she is allied with larger, more powerful countries.
No. 6 Squadron spent the entire Second World War in the Mediterranean theatre. At the outbreak of war it was located in Palestine, proving support to the police and army in that tense region, flying a mix of Hawker Hardys, Gloster Gauntlet and Westland Lysanders. This mix of aircraft would be typical of the squadron for the first two years of the war. From September 1940 the squadron began to operate in the Western Desert, flying tactical reconnaissance missions. For this purpose, one flight was converted to the Hawker Hurricane to provide a fighter escort for the vulnerable Lysanders. June 19 Anglo-Canadian Wartime Relations, 1939-1945 book. Read reviews from world’s largest community for readers. Originated as the author's thesis (doctoral) Start by marking “Anglo-Canadian Wartime Relations, 1939-1945: RAF Bomber Command and No. 6 (Canadian) Group (Modern European History. Great Britain)” as Want to Read: Want to Read saving… Canada - Canada - World War II: On September 9, 1939, eight days after Germany’s invasion of Poland, Canada’s Parliament voted to declare war on Germany, which the country did the next day. (Its separate declaration of war was a measure of the independence granted it in the 1931 Statute of Westminster; in 1914 there had been no such independence and no separate declaration of war.) Aircrew losses were particularly heavy in the RAF Bomber Command. Canadian factories turned out everything from rifles to Lancaster heavy bombers, and Canadian scientists, technicians, and engineers worked on advanced weapons technology, including the atomic bomb (for which Canada supplied the uranium ore). Recent papers in RAF Bomber Command WWII. Papers. People. Initially, as part of Main Force within Bomber Command and later in the elite Pathfinder Force No.8 Group, Epstein flew Short Stirling and Avro Lancaster aircraft against some of the most heavily defended targets in Germany and occupied Europe. In 1944, Epstein was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross following his 35th mission, before being posted to the Pathfinders in No. 7 Squadron. In the following year, he received a Bar to the award, for his continued undiminished skill and courage. After returning to Australia in 1945, Epstein had wanted to fly commercially rather than go back into the family's hardware business. However, he agreed to return but only on the basis that it expanded across Sydney. Only the Canadian units were large enough to be organized into a separate national organization because Canada, unlike Australia and New Zealand, was not directly menaced by Axis aggression and could confidently send its forces overseas. The RAF had not initially warmed to the idea of separate national units, partly because the complex training pattern made it difficult to keep crew from the same nationalities together as they went through the system. and wartime industry.53 The pressure from the Canadian government for the ‘Canadianization’ of the units organized in Bomber Command had more success. On 1 January 1943 an entirely Canadian Group, no. 6, was activated under the command of Air Vice Marshal G. E. Brookes.